DISARMAMENT AND ITS PROCESSES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
DISARMAMENT
AND ITS PROCESSES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
This
seminar discussed the scope of disarmament, the main issues surrounding the
concept including demobilization and reintegration of combatants, the study
also considers the procedure of disarmament and weapon management. This seminar
paper looked into certain recommendations on the procedure of the concept as
against it shortcomings.
This paper
relied on mainly secondary sources and has paid little or no reliance on
primary sources. However, this is due to the fact that the sources boarder on
journal articles, conference material, internet materials and others.
The seminar
paper realized the concept of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament and
its relevance to humanity existence. It further made a view at the procedure of
the said concept and weapon management as it is a vital task for international
bodies to ensure safety of mankind in their municipality. The convention of
cluster munitions was examined and its vitality to the procedure which
signifies its relevance, was exposed, which is to ensure that parties to it has
a major obligation in implementing same.
Disarmament as this discourse revealed, should
be taken seriously and not with kid-gloves. Apart from the recommendations
therein, the monitoring authorities and International Agencies and peacekeeping
operations has a role to play in ensuring that the lives of innocent civilians
in their own municipality is not been terminated under the verge of failure or
as a result of incomplete operation of the procedure.
1.01
INTRODUCTION
Armed conflicts have continued to plague
Nigeria[1]
as a nation, and all other States across the Globe. For a period of iron, the United Nations
peacekeeping operations have been deployed in countries caught in internal,
civil conflicts being waged with large numbers of small arms and light weapons.
Sustainable peace has been difficult to establish in such environments for
several reasons. One of them is the high level of armaments within the country,
which constitutes a major cause of instability even after a peace has been
negotiated. Reducing the level of arms in the country, therefore, has become a
crucial precondition for the consolidation of peace and stability.[2]
However, experience
has shown that disarmament alone has no long-term benefits if not accompanied
by demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society through
economically viable alternative lifestyles, as well as overall socioeconomic development
for the country as a whole. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
ex-combatants form a continuum that is itself a part of the entire peace
process: Where disarmament ends demobilization must begin and must eventually
lead to reintegration, if sustainable peace and development are to be secured
in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations has gained extensive,
probably unparalleled, experience over the past ten years in disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping
environment. [3] Disarmament is a
vital aspect of conflict but it is unfortunate that it is often not given the
well deserved pride of place in the discussion of conflict. This is the sad
case in Nigeria.
Although the
concept of disarmament is a crucial aspect of armed conflict that must be given
considerable attention in the study and management of armed conflict in Nigeria
and elsewhere, it is very vital to observe the concept in full details and also
to have a general view of the procedure involve in this highly sinequanon.
1.02 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The concept is an ‘act of reducing or
depriving of arms’, and is usually regarded as the first step of a disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process. The removal of weapons, ammunition
and explosives is a highly symbolic act in the ending of an individual’s active
role as a combatant.[4] Disarmament also
contributes to establishing a secure environment and paves the way for
demobilization and reintegration to take place. The component of a disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process program needs to be comprehensive,
effective, efficient and safe. It should be designed to reinforce countrywide
security and be planned in coordination with wider peace-building and recovery
efforts. The operation carried out within is only one aspect of a new national
arms control management system, and should support future internal arms control
and reduction measures (small arms and light weapons [SALW] control).
The disarmament component should usually
consist of four main phases: these includes
(1)
Information
collection and operational planning;
(2)
Weapons
collection or retrieval operations;
(3)
Stockpile
management; and
(4)
Destruction.
The disarmament component shall be shaped
by four guiding principles: national sovereignty, armed violence reduction,
safety and capacity development.
To be most effective, this methodology
should be included during the strategic, operational and detailed mission-planning
phases of program development. The technical threat and risks will have a major
influence on the future success or failure of a program, and therefore the appropriate
expertise must be involved from the beginning. The financial costs of this
operational methodology are low when compared with total disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process program costs, yet they have the
potential for high impact on the success of a disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process program.
1.03 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
This seminar paper established the
guiding principles and operational methodology for the safe, effective and
efficient planning and conduct of the disarmament operation. To be most
effective, it is important that this methodology is included during the
strategic, operational and detailed mission planning phases of program
development. As Mentioned inter alia any
disarmament program faces many threats and risks, all of which will have a
significant influence on the future success or failure of a program, and
therefore, the appropriate expertise must be involved from the beginning, to
avoid as many of these risks/threats as possible. It is sinequanon in realizing the
concept of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament and its relevance to
humanity existence. A view at the procedure of the said concept and weapon
management as it is a vital task for international bodies to ensure safety of
mankind in their municipality. The convention of cluster munitions and its
vitality to the procedure which signifies its relevance, was exposed, which is
to ensure that parties to it has a major obligation in implementing same.
1.04
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As
mentioned inter alia, this study is premised on secondary source; therefore,
the research adopted a doctrinal method and context analyses which were used
for the study.
Secondary
sources of materials employed only boarders on, manuals and handbooks articles
in Journals and downloaded materials from internet.
1.05 THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STUDY
The seminar
paper viewed the meaning of the concept of disarmament as well as the procedure
involved it. To ensure the safety of humanity and the national security, plus
curbing terrorism) disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process is an ideal task for every
governmental institution, national and international organizations and the
whole world. It further discussed whether or not the process is achievable
and to what extent has the sovereign states employed it in their respective
territories. Also, to what extent has the commonwealth nations, European Union,
African Union employed the procedure in their respective regimes.
It would be
dissatisfying that despite the importance of the relevance of this concept
after every armed conflict, certain sovereign states pay little or no attention
to the relevancy, let alone employing it as a useful tool in governance.
1.06 LITERATURE REVIEW
It should
be said straight forward that the global and efficient writers around the globe
penned their legal opinion on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants.[5]
It was
Shafor’s view that good faith as essential to the Non
Proliferation Treaty commitment, to comply with international humanitarian law
(IHL)[6]
and that any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all states
at all times to comply with applicable international law, including
international humanitarian law. Meanwhile the Swabrick dwelled on the avoidance
Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration
failure. The effect of the failure of this process is actually devastating on
the human race. The United Nations made explicit the procedures for Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of
Ex-combatants involved in an Armed conflict.
The short-comings of these writers are
that they have failed to critically examine the appraisal or conformation with
the Disarmament procedure. The question remains, how have these rules or
procedures to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants involved in
an armed conflict effected? Where the member states of the Non-proliferation
Treaty obediently carrying out the process? Or are the procedures “white
documented tissue papers”?
1.07 CONCLUSION
It should be noted that Nuclear
disarmament is key to the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)[7]
and the nuclear weapon states (NWS), however, follow different approaches. The
NAM sees disarmament as a single act, independent of any particular conditions,
achieved through a legally binding nuclear weapons convention with a time-bound
path to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. The NWS prefer small steps
and insist that political conditions must be favourable.
They reject any prescriptive time
frame, stating that stability risks would abound. Both positions are connected
to national interests and identities. The NAM states remember colonial
humiliation, embrace sovereignty and reject further constraints justified as
non-proliferation measures. It believes the principle of equality is violated
by the perpetual asymmetry of nuclear possession and renunciation. The NWS
enjoy their privilege, which for some underwrites their aspirations for world
power. To bridge the gap, it might be advisable to set time goals for the
beginning, the end and the implementation of negotiations of each agreed
disarmament step. Prompt negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention may be
counterproductive, but important parameters such as verification, enforcement
and conditions for entry into force could be explored by an ad hoc group in the
Conference on Disarmament or an equivalent expert group in the NPT framework.[8]
2.01 DISARMAMENT: THE MEANING
The black’s Law dictionary[9]
defines the disarmament as a negotiated or voluntary reduction of military arms,
especially nuclear weapons, to a greatly reduced level or to nil.
Disarmament and DDR operations as a whole are often conducted
pursuant to a formal written agreement among the parties concerned. Typically,
this takes the form of an agreement between the government and one or more
former rebel groups who have either entered into a political accommodation, or
acknowledge some kind of conditional military surrender.[10]
Disarmament is the act of reducing,
limiting or abolishing weapons. This generally refers to a countries military
or specific type of weaponry. It is often taken to mean total elimination of
weapons of mass destructions such as nuclear arms.[11]
General and complete disarmament was defined as the elimination of all weapons
of mass destruction coupled with the balance reduction of armed forces and
conventional armament, based on the principle of diminished security, of the
parties with a view of promotion of enhancing stability at a lower military
level taking into account the need of all state to protect their security.[12]
The aim and
Objectives of Disarmament includes the following to wit:
·
Reduction in weapons possessed by,
or available to, armed groups
·
Reduction in actual, or the threat
of, armed violence
·
Minimal casualties during the disarmament
component
·
Improvement in the perception of
human security
·
Public connection between the
availability of weapons and armed violence
·
Build community awareness of the
problem
·
Reduction and disruption of the
transfer and illicit trade of weapons
·
Reduction of weapons in the
community and the culture of weapons
Each phase of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is fraught with pitfalls that threaten
the transition to peace. But perhaps the most delicate and urgent component is
disarmament, which encompasses the handover of weapons and ammunition to the
government or a designated authority, their registration, their safe storage,
and, if required, their destruction.
2.2 TYPES OF DISARMAMENT
•
DDR site based disarmament
–
Sensitization of the combatant about the
Program
–
Pick Up Points (PUPs)
–
Unexploded Ordnance Site (UXO Site)
–
The Disarmament site (D1 Site)
•
Non DDR voluntary weapons collection
initiatives
–
Assessment and planning
–
Incentives
–
Amnesties and enforced weapons
collection programmes
•
Mobile disarmament initiatives
In the context of peacekeeping, disarmament is the collection, control and disposal of small
arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and
often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of
responsible arms management programs.[15]
Demobilization is the process by which armed forces (government
and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband,
as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically,
demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration
and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation
and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.
Disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programs form part of a natural continuum in
the peace process and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated
approach in their planning and implementation. Where disarmament terminates, demobilization
begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences. Reintegration
programs can overlap with long-term peace-building program and some activities
can start at any stage in the peace-making process, even as early as the
initial ceasefire. [16]
In the short term,
the failure to disarm and demobilize former combatants effectively may
contribute to an immediate relapse into war. In the medium and long term,
incomplete or ineffective reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society may
lead to armed criminality by those former soldiers who have no other means of
earning a living. In States where internal structures for civil order have
already been weakened by an internecine conflict, this increase in armed
criminality would be a further detriment to consolidating peace.
Given their
importance in contributing to a sustainable peace in both the short and long
term, measures for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former
combatants will continue to demand importance in international and national
peace efforts.[17]
Peacekeeping
operations, and the international successor arrangements that follow their
termination, are likely to continue to be mandated to perform disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration related tasks or assist national authorities
in performing them.
Disarmament and
demobilization of ex-combatants has been said to take place in the earliest
stages of the peace process and reintegration programs should be ready for
implementation when discharged former combatants arrive at their intended
settlement areas. Therefore, every effort should be made to develop a
comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan during peace
negotiations with the intent to incorporate it into the final peace agreement.
If that is not possible, at least a framework for the plan should be agreed to,
together with an appropriate mechanism for the plan’s subsequent finalization,
implementation and verification. This framework should also serve as the
mechanism through which adjustments to previously agreed elements could be
made, when necessary.[18]
It is important to note therefore that all
of these steps contains political, legal, administrative, organizational,
financial, logistical, and security aspects that must be taken into account.
The disarmament literature is already replete with technical manuals and other
publications designed to help experienced practitioners and donors implement disarmament
projects, and this manual does not attempt to duplicate them. It is hoped that
the value of this publication is to highlight for the engaged but largely
uninformed reader some of the most important obstacles to disarmament in DDR.
Most usefully, the manual uses real-world examples to suggest ways to navigate
those obstacles effectively.
In post-conflict situations where there is a
complete victory by one party or group, the victorious party should enact a law
to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, upon
assuming control of the country.
Several elements of the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process should be pre-determined and clearly
spelt out in the peace agreement. These include the following:
·
Number
of cantonment sites;
·
Timetable
for the ceasefire to come into effect;
·
Timeframe
for the commencement and completion of the disarmament and demobilization
phases (however, target dates set for the commencement and completion of
disarmament and demobilization should be flexible, to achieve the principal
objectives of complete disarmament and demobilization);
·
Early
disposition of collected weapons and ammunition;
·
Requirement
for restructuring the defence and security establishments; and
·
Establishment
of institutions that are to make plans, executes, coordinate and supervise the
entire disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.[19]
2.03 PRECONDITIONS AND PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
In theory, a DDR program should be
included in the text of any peace or ceasefire agreement on the basis of
thorough negotiations involving not only the parties, but also those
international organizations (UN, World Bank) likely to participate in the
program. Moreover, an ideal DDR program should be constructed ‘back to front’,
with sound reintegration programs well on the way to being in place before the
disarmament event begins. This rarely happens.[20]
This is because DDR is rarely part of a signed peace or ceasefire
agreement, and reintegration is often deferred until too late in the process. Part of the problem is that those who are
engaged in negotiations bear less than full responsibility for the
implementation of the signed agreement. It is not uncommon, for instance, for
the parties to a conflict to draw up, behind closed doors, an agreement that
commits some outside body—often the UN or the ‘international community’—to
providing substantial assistance and/or resolving the most intractable
political or security problems. Without consulting the UN, the parties will
then announce their agreement and present the international community with a fait accompli. This was the case with the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement for the resolution of the conflict in the DRC, where
signatories decided to make the UN responsible for the forced disarmament and
repatriation of foreign armed groups in the DRC—a responsibility that the UN
never accepted.[21]
Furthermore, disarmament
must be quickly followed by the delivery of promised reintegration incentives,
or ex-combatants will be tempted to rearm. Regardless of the timing of the disarmament process,
expectations must be managed and the process must include all relevant groups.
Management of expectations cannot be limited to those of the beneficiaries. In
planning negotiations for conflict resolution, actors at all levels must
understand that disarmament cannot be the only solution to political problems.
Disarmament is the result of political solutions. The situation in Haiti, where
a conventional and comprehensive DDR process was demanded by Security Council
resolutions 1542 and 1608 without
due consideration of the absence of political space, a national commitment to
either reconciliation or disarmament, or any of the other basic prerequisites
outlined in the lessons-learned documents of recent processes, is typical of
general misunderstanding of the scope of DDR and of how the uninitiated can
have undeliverable expectations of it. Women associated with and affected by
the conflict should ideally be as fully engaged as possible in the development
of the DDR process at difficult levels.[22]
2.04 PROCEDURES
In a phased process, and in accordance with the
agreed timetable, an initial screening of each force to be disarmed and
demobilized under United Nations Monitoring authority should take place.
Disarmament includes:
·
Surrender
of weapons and ammunition;
·
Registration and disposal of weapons and ammunition;
·
Immediate destruction of armaments in situ;
·
Safe and secure interim storage of weapons and armaments pending
destruction or transfer to the unified national defence force, in accordance
with specified conditions to be in place at the termination of the United
Nations peace mission;
·
Transfer
of registration data from United Nations monitors to the data management unit
of relevant assembly (for opposition forces) or discharge centre (for
government forces); and
·
Transportation of ex-combatants from opposition forces to encampment
areas and transfer of former government forces or civil defence militias to
discharge centers near places of residence.[23]
In accordance with the demobilization
procedures, all groups subject to the formal demobilization process will be
required to assemble at designated sites — assembly areas — en route to
locations where the formal demobilization and discharge processes will take
place. To ensure that disarmament takes place as early as possible in the peace
implementation process, every effort should be made to plan for the disarmament
of all ex-combatants to take place immediately upon their arrival at the
designated assembly areas. Planning should proceed on the basis of phased arrivals,
with lesser numbers initially followed by a gradual increase.[24]
Planners
must be aware, however, that if ex-combatants are tired of fighting and are
looking for a viable alternative and they see a manifestly fair,
well-implemented program with adequate security, there may be a sudden, drastic
increase in the numbers arriving at the assembly areas. This may happen despite
carefully negotiated timetables for phased arrivals. In order to take full
advantage of this momentum, planning must attempt to build in as much excess
capacity as possible at the assembly areas.
At the other extreme is the very real possibility that some forces will
be held back until the very last stages of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process. Planners must be prepared for a quick resurrection of
the disarmament phase if this happens, even though the bulk of the
ex-combatants will be in the later stages of the demobilization and
reintegration process. To avoid situations where the bulk of the forces of one
party are disarmed while those of another party are not, planning should strive
for parallel processes with roughly proportional disarmament occurring of the
various opposing forces.[25]
A realistic timetable for disarmament should be
established that takes account of the time needed to build confidence and
allows for delays in completion of the disarmament process.
Techniques for physical disarmament may vary,
depending on the strength of combatants to be disarmed at a particular time and
the type of weapons, either small arms or heavy weapons, to be collected.
Ideally, the combatants are regrouped and conveyed to the cantonment sites with
their weapons and ammunitions. If the sites are not too distant from their
bases, they may walk. At the disarmament office/tent/table, the combatants
surrender their weapons and ammunition. Procedures for collection and registration
of proscribed categories of weapons, ammunition and ancillary equipment should
provide for the following:
·
Surrender
of all proscribed weapons, ammunition and related materials in the possession
or under the control of each excombatant or related units or sub-units
immediately upon their arrival at the assembly area;
·
Registration
of each weapon; and
·
A record kept of all available information relevant to its proper
identification and immediate disposal, including the following:
·
Type of weapon and related equipment, including quantity and type of
ammunition;
·
Serial
number of weapon(s);
·
Serviceability
of weapon(s), including any modifications;
·
Site where
handed in;
·
Handed
in by whom (name, rank, unit and military ID or equivalent);
·
Handed
in to whom (representative of the international or regional force responsible
for the security of the weapons);
·
Verified
by whom (signature and identification number of international monitors and
monitors of each of the parties); and Weapon history if known, including
manufacturer, details of export and import, details regarding its issuance to
the ex-combatant in question.[26]
In the experience of the United Nations, the
types of small arms and light weapons mostly used in civil conflicts can be
categorized as follows:
·
Small
arms, such as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines,
sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, light machine-guns;
·
Light
weapons, such as heavy machine-guns, hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade
launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of
anti-aircraft missile systems, mortars of calibers of less than 100 mm;
·
Ammunition
and explosives, such as cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles
for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action
anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades.
For crew-operated (section/platoon) weapons,
such as heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft, guided weapons and heavy mortars, etc.,
two to five men may be considered disarmed.
Any entrant who is unable to surrender any
weapon or ammunition and is unable to prove combatant status should not be
accepted for demobilization and reintegration. Eligibility requirements for the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should be
child-conscious. Most formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programs are conceived as opportunities to disarm individual soldiers in
factions (one man/one gun). Yet, disarmament procedures that require weapons to
be surrendered as a criterion for eligibility have often excluded children,
especially girls. Child soldiers must be eligible to enter the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process irrespective of whether they present
themselves at the assembly points with weapons or not.
As a general rule, military-style weapons, both
heavy and light, should be confined to authorized military and, in some cases, public
security forces. Disarmament procedures are, therefore, required for all those
in possession of these weapons. Whether or not to cover non-military-style
firearms in the disarmament process will depend on a number of factors,
including:
-
Degree
to which of the country has become saturated with arms, especially in
comparison with the pre-conflict situation;
-
Who is
holding these weapons—criminal bands, minority groups, citizens in general;
-
Danger
posed by the numbers of arms being held to public security in general and/or to
specified groups, such as demobilized opposition forces;
-
Public
attitudes towards the level of arms being held and relevant local custom and
culture; and
-
Degree
to which public security can be reasonably assured and can be perceived to be
assured.[27]
As a general rule, hunting rifles and
traditional weapons, such as spears and machetes, will not be included in the
disarmament process. However, this approach may need to be reconsidered in circumstances
where these types of weapons constitute a substantial threat to members of the
general public or identifiable sub-groups. [28]
Upon completion of the registration, the
fighters are pronounced disarmed. Now they are officially considered
ex-combatants and receive a personalized disarmament note/card, which they take
to the office/tent in charge of demobilization. Disarmament may be effected in
barracks or in the camps where the combatants live, train or work. This may be
more convenient for the disarming of well organized and disciplined armed
groups. Ex-combatants disarmed in military installations can also be
demobilized from these locations.[29]
It is important to keep exact records on the
strength of disarmed personnel. Exact figures are required for three principal reasons
which may be assessment for appropriate logistical support during cantonment,
or assessment
for adequate funds required to effect severance payments and other
reintegration benefits
Experience has shown that formal disarmament
conducted by peacekeeping missions of either the United Nations or regional organizations
does not lead to the complete elimination or collection of prescribed weapons.
Even with post-demobilization verification conducted by peacekeeping missions,
large quantities of weapons remain either in hidden storage sites, arms caches
or in unauthorized private hands. Arms often remain unreported because the
parties are not entirely confident in the peace process and hold back some of
their best weapons for a possible renewal of hostilities.
Violence and other forms of criminal activities
in post-conflict areas can be partly attributed to the ready availability of
these weapons. In order to help reduce these criminal acts and consolidate
peace and stability, necessary for the promotion of sustainable development, it
is imperative that mechanisms to collect these weapons are evolved and
implemented after the peacekeeping operations have withdrawn. At the conclusion
of disarmament, a law against the illegal possession of arms should be
promulgated.[30]
2.05 IMPROPER DISARMAMENT
Improper management of weapons collected through
the disarmament processes can create security risks similar to those caused by
incomplete disarmament. If armories and other arms storage facilities are not
fully secure and well protected, the collected arms can easily be stolen.
Rearmament of ex-combatants, increase of violence and crime and the export to
other conflict areas might be the consequences.[31]
Security of storage sites for arms, ammunition,
explosives and all military hardware used for combat should always be a top
priority. Decisions on the control of keys to storage facilities should be made
keeping in mind the political and military situation prevailing in the country.[32]
Public security forces have too often proven
unable or unwilling to provide even minimum security for the general public
and/or specific sub-groups such as disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants of
opposition forces trying to reintegrate into the community. Planning for
disarmament must therefore seriously consider the need for an armed military
force, international or regional, with responsibility for the security of
collected weapons, the assembly areas and the excombatants from their arrival
until their final discharge at the end of the demobilization process.
Consideration should be given to providing
international police monitors with certain executive policing powers, which may
necessitate that they be armed. In extremely hostile public security
environments, planners may have to consider provision of armed military back-up
of the police monitors in the exercise of their executive policing functions.
While a reasonable quantity of collected weapons may be reserved for use by the
new, unified army or re-organized defence force and other state security
bodies, determined effort should be made to destroy the rest, as soon as
practicable. Details about the disposal and destruction of weapons should be
explicitly stated in the peace.
When disarmament is incomplete, several
incentive programs can be used to mop up weapons not surrendered or hidden
away. These programs include “turn-in”, “buy-back”, “swap” or
weapons-for-development programs, where weapons can be traded in for cash, or
swapped for food, housing and construction material, among other things. These
programs may be effective if they do not themselves create a market for arms.
The concept of buying back weapons from ex-combatants has been criticized by
some donors as a scheme that rewards irresponsible armed personnel who may have
done much harm to society and innocent civilians. If the warring parties are
preserving a military option — in case the peace agreement fails—an exchange of
cash for arms may achieve little more
than to provide cash for purchasing new weapons by turning in old ones.[33]
3.01 THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS[34]
To date, 118 states have joined the
convention of which 98 are States parties, and the remaining 29 are signatories
that have yet to ratite the conventions.[35]
The Convention on Cluster munitions (CCM) [36]
is an international Treaty that prohibits the use, or transfer and stockpile of
Cluster Bombs. It is also a type of explosive weapon which scatters sub
munitions.[37]
Ever since cluster munitions were first
used in the 1940s, civilians have paid dearly for their unreliability and
inaccuracy. These weapons, delivered in massive numbers over vast areas that
have killed and thousands of civilians in war-torn countries, particularly in
Asia, Europe and the Middle East.[38]
The use of Cluster munitions was aimed at creating an International Treaty to
prohibit cluster munitions that cause “unacceptable suffering” to civilians.
The process was open to all states committed to urgently adopting such a
treaty. And by adopting this Convention, states have put in place the final
plank in the international legal structure addressing the effects of weapons
that don’t stop killing. This Convention [39]
now enables the ICRC to possess the necessary tools to prevent or remedy the
often tragic consequences for civilians of all explosive munitions used in
armed conflict.[40]
Meanwhile, much time and energy and resources were required to implement the
convention. States ought to ratify the Convention and all governments, armed
forces and armed groups, must implement same.
3.02 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONVENTION[41]
By virtue of Article 4(1) [42]
clearly defines the obligation on each party state that ratifies the
convention. The Article provides thus:
1.
Each
party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction
of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas
under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are
located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into
force of this convention for that state party, such clearance and destruction
shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that
date;
(b) Where after entry into force of this
convention for that state party, cluster munitions have become cluster
munitions remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such
clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later
than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such
cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
(c) Upon fulfilling either of its
obligations such set out in sub paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that
state party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next meeting of state
parties. [43]
It is important to note that mechanism
has been involved for a feedback of the fulfillment of these obligations. This
may ensure adequate assessment of same because, each party needs to make a
declaration of compliance of the provisions of the Law.
Furthermore, the Convention provides
that each state shall embark on certain measures regarding international
cooperation and assistance. The steps [44]
include:
(a) Survey, asses and record that threat
posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster
munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
(b) Asses and priorities needs in terms of
making, p;rotection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to
mobilize resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities,
building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and
methodologies;
(c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that
cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are
perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure
the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking
readily recognizable by the affected community should be utilized in the
marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary
markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant
to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked
boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and
which side is considered to be safe;
(d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition
remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
(e) Conduct risk reduction education to
ensure to awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition
contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.
Furthermore, the Convention provides
that if
a state party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure
the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to
above within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that
state party, it may submit a request to a meeting of states parties on a review
conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and
destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years, the
requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for
that state party to complete its obligations. [45]
It must be
noted that this extension must be accompanied with a detailed explanation of
the reason for the proposed extension,[46]
the preparation of future work and status of work already conducted under
national clearance,[47]
amongst other things.
4.01 RECOMMENDATIONS
The United Nations has a role to play like been
involved early in the negotiating process, particularly those departments and
agencies that would be required to implement elements of the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration plan. Internal to the United Nations, a planning committee
comprising relevant departments and agencies should be established as early as
possible. The interdepartmental task force, established for potential and
actual peacekeeping operations, is an existing mechanism that could be used for
this purpose.
The United Nations should encourage and assist
the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration plan as well as its incorporation in the peace agreement. The
United Nations should be in a position to provide negotiating guidance to the
parties in the form of the following:
·
Substantive
inputs to the design of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
·
Advice
on the appropriate mechanisms for its planning, implementation and
verification; and
·
Identification
of the need for, and where necessary, provision of the necessary technical
expertise in support of the planning process.[48]
The peace agreement should also authorize a third
party, such as the United Nations or the relevant regional organization, to
monitor that provisions on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are being
honoured in full by all parties, that violations are checked and that the
welfare of ex-combatants is being adequately addressed.
Moreover, the monitoring authority could enlist
international support to put pressure on a party that is reluctant to disarm
and to ask for international economic and financial assistance for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration.
The United Nations should be involved early in
the negotiating process, particularly those departments and agencies that would
be required to implement elements of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration plan. Internal to the United Nations, a planning committee
comprising relevant departments and agencies should be established as early as
possible. The interdepartmental task force, established for potential and
actual peacekeeping operations, is an existing mechanism that could be used for
this purpose.
The United Nations should encourage and assist
the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration plan as well as its incorporation in the peace agreement. The
United Nations should be in a position to provide negotiating guidance to the
parties in the form of the following:
·
Substantive
inputs to the design of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
·
Advice
on the appropriate mechanisms for its planning, implementation and
verification; and
·
Identification
of the need for, and where necessary, provision of the necessary technical
expertise in support of the planning process.
·
The
peace agreement should also authorize a third party, such as the United Nations
or the relevant regional organization, to monitor that provisions on
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are being honoured in full by all
parties, that violations are checked and that the welfare of ex-combatants is
being adequately addressed.
4.02 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The procedure of Disarmament may be summarized
under the following subheads -
v
Weapons, Ammunition
and Explosives Collection, Registration, Transportation and Storage which may
include:
·
Planning
•
Weapons collection
•
Ammunition and UXO collection
• Registration, marking and record-keeping,
• Weapons, ammunition and explosives transportation
• Weapons, ammunition and explosives storage
• Weapons storage
• Ammunition and explosives storage
• Verification procedures
v Stockpile Management
Phase which may include
·
Stockpile security
·
Storage of weapons
·
Storage of
ammunition and explosives
v Destruction of Weapons,
Ammunition and Other Explosives
·
Weapon destruction
techniques and technologies
·
Destruction
planning and operations sequence
·
Destruction of UXO
·
Destruction of
rockets, missiles, etc
·
Stockpile
destruction
·
Open burning &
open detonation
·
National planning
guidelines
Moreover, the monitoring authority could enlist
international support to put pressure on a party that is reluctant to disarm
and to ask for international economic and financial assistance for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration.
Experience has shown that formal disarmament
conducted by peacekeeping missions of either the United Nations or regional organizations
does not lead to the complete elimination or collection of proscribed weapons.
Even with post-demobilization verification conducted by peacekeeping missions,
large quantities of weapons remain either in hidden storage sites, arms caches
or in unauthorized private hands. Arms often remain unreported because the
parties are not entirely confident in the peace process and hold back some of
their best weapons for a possible renewal of hostilities.
Resurgence or increase in banditry, violence and
other forms of criminal activities in post-conflict areas can be partly
attributed to the ready availability of these weapons. In order to help reduce
these criminal acts and consolidate peace and stability, necessary for the
promotion of sustainable development, it is imperative that mechanisms to
collect these weapons must be evolved and implemented after the peacekeeping
operations have withdrawn.
At the conclusion of disarmament, a law against
the illegal possession of arms should be promulgated and carefully monitored.
[1]
Wariboko O.
P. C (2015) Armament and Disarmament in Nigeria Juxtaposing Niger-Delta
Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria. www.ajol.info (last visited on
25th January, 2016)
[2] The United Nation, Department of
Peacekeeping Nations, on The
Publication, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
in a Peacekeeping Environment, (2000) distributed by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations Lessons Learned Unit, in cooperation with the
Training Unit, New York.
[3]
(Ibid.) Operations that
have contributed to this experience include the United Nations Transition
Assistance Group in Namibia; the United Nations Observer Group in Central
America; the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia; two United
Nations Angola Verification Missions; the United Nations Operation in Somalia
II; the United Nations Operation in Mozambique; the United Nations Verification
Mission in Guatemala; the United Nations Transitional Administration for
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium; and the United Nations Observer
Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These operations have been extensively
studied by both the United Nations itself and outside experts with a view to
identifying lessons learned.
[4] Integrated
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (1 August 2006) http://www.unddr.org.
[5] E. Shafor (2011) The Emerging
paradigm for non-use and Elimination of Nuclear weapon. See also www.ajol.com
P.
Swarbrick (2007) Avoiding Disarmament Failure: the Critical Link in Disarmament
Demobilization and Reintegration, published in Switzerland. See also www.smallarmssurvey.org See also The United Nation,
Department of Peacekeeping Nations, on The Publication, Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment,
(SUPRA)
[6] The Treaty (with 190 member
states) of the Non Proliferation Of Nuclear weapons, is an international Treaty
whose objective is to prevent the spread of Nuclear weapons and technology and
a completion of disarmament. See also www.wikipedia.org/non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons (last visited on 1st February,
2016)
[7] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is
a group of states which are not formally aligned with or against any major
power bloc. With 120 members state. See also www.wikipedia.org/non-aligned-movement
[8]
Dr Harald
Müller (2012) The NPT review process
and strengthening the treaty: Disarmament, Published by The European network of
independent non-proliferation think tanks University in Frankfurt.
[9] The Black’s Law Dictionary 7th
edition, page 475
[10] See Swarbrick op cit at pg 16
[15]
See The
United Nation, Department of Peacekeeping Nations, on The Publication
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Peacekeeping
Environment op cit at page 15
[16]
Ibid at 16
[18] Ibid. Also the DDR
program should be included in the text of any peace or ceasefire agreement on
the basis of thorough negotiations involving not only the parties, but also
those international organizations (UN, World Bank) likely to participate in the
program. Moreover, an ideal DDR program should be constructed ‘back to front’,
with sound reintegration programs well on the way to being in place before the
disarmament event begins. This rarely happen. Swarbrick op cit at pg 19.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See P. Sawrbrick op. cit at page
18
[21] The Lusaka Agreement between the
Countries of Angola, DCR, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe sought to bring
an end to hostilities within the territory of DCR. It addresses several issues
including cessation of hostilities, establishment of a joint military
commission, compromising representatives of the belligerent, withdrawal of
foreign groups, disarmament, demobilizing and reintegrating of combatants,
release of prisoners and hostages et al,
to facilitate an all-inclusive inter-Congolese
dialogue. The agreement also calls for the deployment of a UN peace keeping
force to monitor the Ceasefire, investigate violations with Joint Military
Commission and disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armed groups. See also www.peacemaker.un.org (last visited of February 5,
2016)
[22]
The disarmament process
stopped before it actually started. Haiti’s paramilitary and ex-military forces
were heavily armed and ongoing impunity allows them to continue to repress and
extort unarmed population See also L. Richardson in Disarmament Derailed www.nacla.org
[23] See also The United Nation,
Department of Peacekeeping Nations, on The Publication, Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, op cit at pg. 48
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid. Also DDR planners should always be skeptical of
numbers provided by armed group leaders, and should allow a degree of
flexibility in their budgetary and security planning in light of this. See also
Swarbrick op cit at pg 35
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Ibid.
[30] An agreement can also be made by
both sides which is acceptable to complete the process. For instance, following
the 1996 agreement, the Moro National Liberation Front had effectively
demobilized from combat mode but had not been fully disarmed, such agreement
could suffice. See also www.bongmendoza.wordpress.com
[31] The
United Nation, Department of Peacekeeping Nations, on The Publication, Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, op cit at pg.35
[32]
Ibid
[34] Cluster Munitions means a
conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive
submunitions. See Articles 2 of the Convention.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Jakob Kellenberger, the
president of the committee on Red Cross in his Foreword on the Convention of
Cluster Munitions.
[39] Conventions like the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the protocol on Explosive Remnants of War
and the Convention on cluster Munitions et
al are also included.
[40] Jakob Kellenberger (Supra)
[41] Article 4 of the convention
deals solely with the Clearance and destruction of Cluster Munition remnants
and risk reduction education which is the most relevant part of the Convention
to this Topic
[42] Convention on Cluster Munitions.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Articles 2 a-e Ibid
[45] Article
5 Ibid.
[46] Article
6 (b) Ibid.
[47]
Article 6 (c) Ibid.
[48]
See also The United Nation,
Department of Peacekeeping Nations, on The Publication, Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, op cit at pg. 57
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